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1.

I.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Early this year, AdvertisingAge magazine named "the consumer" as its 2006
"agency of the year." 1 This was days after Time magazine had selected the
consumer as "person of the year.",2 With these exaltations of the amateur creator,
the editors acknowledged the burgeoning of "peer-generated" media content in the
form of wikis, blogs, video sharing, podcasts, and other media genres. What
impressed the press was the tremendous communicative power that individuals can
wield through digital networks and the impact of this power on industrial
economies. Scholars and other commentators too have celebrated what is known

*Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Camden. Thanks to Carmen Thomas and
Christopher McDonald of the University of South Carolina School of Law for the invitation to speak
at the South Carolina Law Review symposium and for their editorial assistance.
1. Matthew Creamer, John Doe Edges out JeffGoodby: The '06 Explosion of Video, Blogs, and
Websites Confirmed What We Knew All Along Consumer IsKing," ADVERTISING AGE at S-4, Jan. 8,
2007.
2. Lev Grossman. Personof the Year: You. TIME, Dec. 25, 2006. at 38 (explaining that the "you"
are the founders of Web 2.0 and what Time argues is a new digital democracy); see also Jeff Howe,
Your Web, Your Way, TIME, Dec. 25, 2006, at 60 (giving brief overview of peer-generated content,
using the term, "crowdsourcing").
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as "Web 2.0" as a transformational force in communications.3
The AdvertisingAge story featured a short video, created by two "geeks" from
Maine, that bested brand managers at their own businesses. The men-one aj uggler
and the other a lawyer-produced a video of themselves dropping Mentos mints
into Diet Coke bottles, setting off foamy geysers of carbonated drink majestically
timed to spout like an Italian fountain.4 The men posted the clip on the Revver
social media web site, where viewers downloaded it millions of times. 5 Mentos
mint sales spiked 15%.6 Coca-Cola, though initially frowning on the demonstration
as inconsistent with its brand image, eventually posted the video on its website.7
Coca-Cola and Mentos then both exploited the video by sponsoring contests that
solicited yet more explosive videos.8
There are several interesting aspects to this story. Most obviously, it shows that
the power to disseminate brand-related messages is now widely distributed.
Advertisers understand that consumers may sometimes be able to connect each
other to brands and to outperform professionals in delivering positive brand
messages. The power of the peer-to-peer model of production is changing the way
advertisers think about communications and how much control they are willing to
yield over brand management. 9 As consumers express their devotions to brands in

3. For academic commentary. see, for example, YOCHAI BENKLER. THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS:
How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006) (describing the impact ofpeer
networks and shared digital projects, like Wikipedia, on individual and political freedoms); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOWMANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 148 49 (2006) (describing the ability
of any individual to edit content on wild web sites); Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-toAmateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 951, 979-89 (2004) (describing instances of "unauthorized amateur
authorship" and "new forms of collaborative creativity"). See also infra notes 10 13.
4. Creamer. supra note 1, at S-4.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Mentos Gesyer Videos Contest. http://www.mentosgeysers.com/ (last visited June 4.2007)
(posting winners of Mentos contest); The Coca-Cola Company. Products and Packaging Myths and
Rumors, http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/contactus/myths rumors/packaging-mentos.htm1) (last
visited June 4, 2007) (detailing corporate approach to contests).
9. At the annual conference of the Association of National Advertisers in 2006, Procter & Gamble
Co. urged companies to "let go" of their brands. Creamer. supra note 1. at S-5 (describing this event
as "the equivalent ofa then-still-very-folky Bob Dylan plugging in an electric guitar at the Newport Jazz
Festival in 1965"). For an evangelism of the power of the people to transform marketing, see BEN
MCCONNELL & JACKIE HUBA, CITIZEN MARKETERS: WHEN PEOPLE ARE THE MESSAGE (2007).
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blogs,' ° wikis," video-sharing sites like YouTube, 12 and social networking sites like
MySpace and Facebook, 13 brand owners monitor, exploit, and sometimes imitate
the genre.14 These forms of decentralized and collaborative communications have
become so important for brand owners that the Nielsen rating service is scrambling
to come up with new ways of calibrating online brand "buzz."' 5
Web 2.0 phenomena challenge the structure and application of advertising law
as they have challenged other branches of information law. The regulation of false
advertising, like copyright law, was designed to manage information flows in
relatively controlled environments where few speakers were capable of mass
communication. Also like copyright law, false advertising law assumes a model in
which authorship is singular or several, not massively composite. In the
environment of peer production, by contrast, all are capable of mass communication
and authorship is frequently cumulative as users remix and mash up information
provided by others. 6 As many have observed, changes in the production and use
of copyrighted works stress copyright doctrine. 7 The very same technologicallypropelled cultural shifts stress false advertising law.
This Essay offers some tentative thoughts on how peer promotions fit into the

10. See, e.g., Ikeal-acker, http://ikeahacker.blogspot.com/ (last visited June 4, 2007);
McChronicles, Chronicling the McDonald's Brand Experience from the Customers' Point of View,
http://mcchronicles.blogspot.com/ (last visited June 4, 2007); Me and My Diet Coke,
http://meandmydietcoke.blogspot.com/ (last visited June 4, 2007).
11. A wiki is a collaborative work of many authors who may add, delete, and edit without
attribution. Cunningham & Cunningham, Inc., WikiPhilosophy, http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?WikiPhilosophy
(last visited June 4, 2007); see also Abbey Klaassen, ForgetMessage Boards. Wikis Are Where It ' At,
ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 5, 2007, at 26 (discussing the wiki that T-Mobile created for its Sidekick
mobile phone, through which consumers can comment on "how to pimp out the inside of the phone and
[provide] a wish list of improvements the community would like to see").
12. See, e.g.,
Fast Love, Posting of JoshFlowers to YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=ihhEp3uTZck (January 31,2007) (filming interviews with fast food drive-thru patrons about what
they love); I Love McDonalds, Posting of Carloslocol to YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v fC--ULW7vRQ (October 16. 2006) (rapping love song to McDonald's).
13.
See, e.g.,McDonalds Double Cheese Burger, http://www.myspace.com/
mdsdoublecheeseburger (last visited June 4, 2007) (user-generated page for McDonald's with over
2,000 friends, although these "friends" also include advertisements): ADIDAS: All Day 1Dream About
Soccer, http://rutgers.facebook.com/group.php?gid 2212326770 (last visited June 4.2007) (Adidas fan
site with over 2,000 members, but only accessible through Facebook account).
14. See, e.g., Adidas Soccer, http://www.myspace.com/adidassoccer (last visited June 4, 2007)
(official friend site of Adidas Soccer).
15. See Nielsen BuzzMetrics, History, http://www.nielsenbuzzmetrics.com/history.asp (last visited
June 4, 2007).
16. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expressionforthe InformationSociety, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1. 10-13 (2004) (describing the digital media
"cultural bricolage" of"glomming on" with examples such as blogs and Fan Fiction sites. "which are
devoted to the creation of stories about particular movies, books, and television shows").
17. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928 29 (2005)
(acknowledging the strain on copyright values by the "digital distribution of copyrighted material") see
also WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW. AND THE FUTURE OF
ENTERTAINMENT (2004); JESSICALITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ON THE INTERNET (2001); NEIL W. NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX: PROPERTY IN
EXPRESSION/FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (forthcoming 2008).
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structure of federal false advertising law. It is important to emphasize that most peer
promotions, which are spontaneous commentary on a product with no connection
to the brand owner, are not advertising at all. The noncommercial speaker's
commercialization of her speech is a matter of indifference to advertising law. The
story is quite different, however, where brand owners have themselves created
"peer" promotions or adopted these communications for marketing purposes. In
these cases, there is commercial speech which, depending on its content, may be
regulated.
It is the gray area between brand control and no control where peer promotions
most challenge the application of advertising law and its efficacy. Where brand
owners sponsor peer promotions but conceal their involvement, the resulting
communication mixes the commercial speech of the sponsor with the
noncommercial speech of the peer. The borders of commercial speech have shifted
with each innovation in modern marketing, particularly as advertising has become
more image-based and integrated into other forms of media content. Mixed peeradvertiser promotions take the blurring of commercial and noncommercial speech
one step further and pose more insistently the central question of advertising law:
how do we balance the desirability of regulating for transparent commercial
communications with the free speech dangers of regulating at the commercialexpressive interface?
Part II shows how American commercial speech jurisprudence and federal false
advertising law developed to secure the consumer benefits of truthful informational
advertising in the mass media. Successive generations of marketing strategies
departed from this straightforward advertising model, reaching the consumer in new
ways and reducing the informational content of advertising. These new techniques,
particularly when they combined commercial and noncommercial speech, required
that commercial speech doctrines balance the goal of consumer protection with free
speech values. Part III shows how peer promotions fit into this history of marketing
development and classifies such promotions into pure peer, fake peer, and mixed
peer promotions. Especially where brand owners conceal their involvement in what
are mixed peer/sponsored promotions, there is a danger that the resulting
communication will deceive credulous consumers. Whether false advertising law
can or should discipline such communications will depend on the sponsor's role in
the communication and evolving consumer responses.
II.

MARKETING EVOLUTION AND THE LAW

The use of peer-to-peer communications to advertise is part of a larger
innovation in marketing called "integrated marketing communication" (IMC).
Brand owners inaugurated the era of modern marketing by using the national media
to transmit promotional information, moving shortly thereafter to the transmission
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of image advertising by the same means. 8 IMC departs in both message and means
from the mass media advertising strategies of the previous generations. Where
traditional advertising campaigns transmit messages from headquarters to
consumers, IMC campaigns often seek messages that originate with consumers
themselves. Where traditional campaigns rely heavily on "old media" like
television and print media, IMC campaigns use a variety of consumer contacts,
including public relations, sales, editorial content, and online networks. 9
Courts and regulators have developed the federal law of false advertising in
response to marketing innovations, always struggling to balance consumer
protection goals with free speech goals. The basic premise of the law is that the
regulation of (false) information is important for consumers and poses acceptable
risks to free speech, but the regulation of (false) images is unacceptably risky. This
is because truth and falsity are easier to untangle in informational advertising.
Moreover, non-informational, or image, advertising often mixes noncommercial
with commercial expression, the regulation of which could compromise protected
speech. Below, we see the close relationship between the informational value of
advertising and the rationales for regulation.
A.

InformationalAdvertising

The first phase of modern marketing involved the mass communication of
information about product and price. In its classic form, informational advertising
asserts factual claims about a product or service in an organized campaign designed
to reach a large portion of the relevant market. 20 It is this kind of advertising that
has by and large been the subject of advertising law and commercial speech
jurisprudence, starting with VirginiaState Board ofPharmacyv. VirginiaCitizens
Consumer Council, Inc.21
Consideration of informational advertising led the Supreme Court, in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy, to hold for the first time that advertising merits some

18. See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEX. L. REV.
697,700 (1993) ("The history of modern advertising is the story of the general movement from productinformation to image and lifestyle advertising.").
19. See infra notes 60 61 and accompanying text.
20. See CHARLES GOODRUM & HELEN DALRYMPLE, ADVERTISING IN AMERICA: THE FIRST 200
YEARS 37 38 (1990) (discussing informational advertising in the 1920s); see also STUART EWEN,
CAPTAINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: ADVERTISING AND THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF THE CONSUMER CULTURE

100-01 (1976) (discussing the movement from informational to image advertising).
21. 425 U.S. 748 (1976); see, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002)
(pharmaceutical advertising); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly. 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (tobacco product
advertising); United States v. United Foods, Inc.. 533 U.S. 405 (2001) (mushroom advertising): Greater
New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (casino advertising); 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (liquor price advertising); Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (beer alcohol content labeling): Ohralik v. Ohio State BarAss'n, 436
U.S. 447 (1978) (attorney soliciting); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (attorney price
advertising). For a list of commercial speech cases and the categories of advertising that they address,
see First Amendment Center, Commercial Speech, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/faclibrary/
libraryexpression.aspx?topic commercial speech&subheading y (last visited June 4. 2007).
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limited degree of First Amendment protection.22 The Court conceptualized
advertising as the "dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling
what product, for what reason, and at what price. 23 Where such speech is truthful,
it is constitutionally protected on the instrumental grounds that factual commercial
information benefits consumers.24 The "consumer's interest in the free flow of
commercial information," the Court wrote, "may be as keen, if not keener by far,
than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate. 25 False commercial
speech, by contrast, does not benefit consumers and can be regulated
on the same
26
instrumental grounds without offense to the First Amendment.
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy changed the course of commercial speech
jurisprudence thirty years after the Court had first concluded that "the Constitution
imposes no . . . restraint[s] on government as respects purely commercial
advertising."2 This change was due in part to economic research that emphasized
the role of informational advertising in facilitating welfare-enhancing market
exchanges.28 According to this theory, which remains the conventional wisdom,
informational advertising generates social welfare by reducing search costs and
improving market transparency.29
The essentially informational function of advertising in the first part of the
twentieth century shaped federal false advertising law, the object of which is to
sanction the false-and encourage the truthful-communication of commercial
information. The Federal Trade Commission Act, section 5, provides for agency
action against the dissemination of "false advertisements ' '30 that constitute "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 31 The Lanham Act, section
43(a), creates a private right of action for those injured by "commercial advertising
or promotion, [that] misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of [the advertiser's] or another person's goods, services, or

22. Va. State Bd ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773.
23. Id. at 765.
24. Id. at 773.
25. Id. at 748; see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 653 (1985)
("[T]he extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the
value to consumers of the information such speech provides."): Cent. Hudson Gas & Elect. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) ("The First Amendment's concern for commercial
speech is based on the informational function of advertising.").
26. Va. State Bd ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773.
27. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52. 54 (1942).
28. See JOHN E. CALFEE, FEAR OF PERSUASION 8-18 (1997) (describing the development of
economic theory underlying contemporary commercial speech doctrine and trade regulation); Fred S.
McChesney, De-Bates and Re-Bates: The Supreme Court's Latest Commercial Speech Cases, 5 Sup.
CT. ECON. REV. 81, 86-90 (1997) (noting that the commercial speech doctrine relied on economic
theory and empirical research supporting benefits of advertising on competition).
29. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Aader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of
Advertising,90 HARV. L. REV. 661,663 (1977) (stating that advertising reduces consumer search costs);
RICHARD A. POSNER, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE FTC 3 (1973) ("For markets to operate
effectively, buyers must have accurate information about the quality and other characteristics of the
products offered for sale.").
30. 15 U.S.C. § 52 (2000).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000).
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commercial activities. 3 2 State law provides for similar private and public rights of
action against false advertising.33
Since the purpose of false advertising laws is to ensure that consumers receive
accurate information about products and services being advertised, an action will
lie only where advertisers have made express or implied claims of fact. 34 The
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) pursues only objective misrepresentations that
are likely to materially harm the consumer.35 The Lanham Act too requires that
advertising be demonstrably false or misleading and the plaintiff materially
harmed.36 Under either law, appeals devoid of actual or implied facts are generally
not actionable and often are dismissed as mere opinion or puffery.37
Commercial speech law recognizes that advertising regulation threatens the
production of truthful commercial speech. In the noncommercial sphere, the
concern about these chilling effects led the Supreme Court to accord false speech

32. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, sec. 132, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § I125(a)(l)(B) (2000)
(originally enacted as Act of July 5, 1946, 60 Stat. 427) ("Any person who, in commercial advertising
or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or
another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person
who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged by such act.") (Unless otherwise noted, textual
reference to the Lanham Act denotes title 15, section 43 of the United States Code, which discusses
false advertising.). Courts have understood this cause of action to be limited to competitors. See Jean
Wegman Bums, ConfusedJurisprudence:False Advertising Under the Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. REV.
807, 836 37 (1999).
33. See, e.g.. 1 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 1:26, at
1-181 (4th ed. Thomson/West 2003) (describing state agencies similar to the FTC and judicial
interpretations of state laws based on interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission Act).
34. See generally Bums, supra note 32, at 867 68.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (The FTC may only take action against activity that "causes or is likely to
cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and
not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition."). An act or practice is
deceptive only if there is a representation or omission of information that is likely to materially mislead
a reasonable consumer-that is,
to mislead in a way that "affect[s] the consumer's conduct or decision
with regard to a product or service." FED. TRADE COMM'N, DECEPTION POLICY STATEMENT 3 (1983).
appended to Cliffdale Assoc's, Inc., 103 F.T.C. I 10, 175 (1984); see also Novartis Corp. v. FTC, 223
F.3d 783, 786 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); see also Logan v.Burgers Ozark Country Cured Hams Inc., 263 F.3d
447 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. Am. Simmental Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1035, 1042
(8th Cir. 1999)) (setting forth elements required in a Lanham Act false advertising claim, including (1)
"that the defendant made a false statement of fact about its product in a commercial advertisement; (2)
that the statement actually deceived or has a tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its audience:
[and] (3) the deception is likely to influence the purchasing decision"). Literally false ads are presumed
to be materially deceptive, while the plaintiffmust prove that a misleading ad was materially deceptive.
Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 502 (5th Cir. 2000); Castrol, Inc. v. Quaker State
Corp.. 977 F.2d 57, 62 (2nd Cir. 1992).
37. See, e.g.,
FED. TRADE COMM'N, DECEPTIONPOLICY STATEMENT. supra note 35, at 14 & n.41.
appended to Cliffdale Assoc 's,103 F.T.C. at 181 (defining puffery as a form of opinion, not fact, that
is not deceptive as a matter of law). See generallyDavid A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever,
91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1396 (2006).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:683

full First Amendment protection from regulation lest speakers self-censor.38 In the
commercial sphere, by contrast, the Court held that information "more likely to
deceive.., than to inform" could be regulated without constitutional concern. 39 The
speech-chilling effects often produced by regulation would not plague commercial
expression, the Court deemed, because commercial speakers may more easily avoid
falsehoods.4 oThis confidence in the commercial speaker assumes that the difference
between what is true and what is false is knowable and relatively clear, as it often
is with factual claims.
We see, thus, the centrality of informational advertising to advertising law and
underlying commercial speech jurisprudence. Advertising facts deserve
constitutional protection, iftrue, because they educate consumers. And unlike other
kinds of speech, these facts are permissibly regulated, if false, because they are
without value and easily identified. 4
B. Image Advertising
What of advertising that contains no facts and where truth and falsity are hard

38. While finding "no constitutional value in false statements of fact," Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc..
418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974), the Court has protected false noncommercial speech "to eliminate the risk
of undue self-censorship and the suppression of truthful material," Herbertv. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 172
(1979). and to give speech the "breathing space" it needs to thrive, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 272 (1964). But see N. Y Times, 376 U.S. at 279 n. 19 ("Even a false statement may be deemed
to make a valuable contribution to public debate.").
39. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,463; see also Edenfield
v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993) ("[T]he State may ban commercial expression that is fraudulent or
deceptive without furtherjustification."); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) ("We foresee no obstacle to a State's dealing effectively with" false
commercial speech and even speech that "is not provably false, or even wholly false, but only deceptive
or misleading."). See generally Martin H. Redish. The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 458 (1971)
(recognizing that courts had not protected false advertising).
40. Va. State Bd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24 (positing that the commercial speaker is
particularly well positioned to verify the truth: "[T]he advertiser seeks to disseminate information about
a specific product or service that he himself provides and presumably knows more about than anyone
else."); see also id at 777 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[T]he commercial advertiser generally knows the
product or service he seeks to sell and is in a position to verify the accuracy of his factual
representations before he disseminates them."). But see Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suitsfor False
Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law ofDeception, 78 VA. L. REV.
1, 14 (1992) (unintentional false statements are as inevitable in advertising as in noncommercial
speech); Daniel A. Farber, CommercialSpeech and FirstAmendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 372,
385, 386 (1979) ("[P]olitical speech is often quite verifiable by the speaker." while "[t]here may well
be uncertainty about some quality of a product.").
41. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens, J. concurring) (False
commercial speech lacks the value that sometimes inheres in false or misleading political speech.");
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) ("[L]eeway for untruthful or misleading
expression that has been allowed in other contexts has little force in the commercial arena."); see also
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes,andFree Speech: The Implicationsof44 Liquormart,
1996 SuP. CT. REV. 123, 156 (1996) (asserting that false advertising is particularly harmful because the
consumer is unable to assess "information needed to question the advertiser's claim").
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to discern? Is such speech worth protecting, and is it possible to regulate?
The claims of fact that false advertising law covers came to be a diminishing
share of all commercial messages with the maturation of the second phase of
modern marketing: image and lifestyle advertising.42 The sales pitch in an image
ad, such as the Marlboro Man, appeals not to the rational, but to the emotional, the
libidinal, or the subconscious. Neither Lanham Act nor FTC false advertising
claims can reach such images in the absence of at least implied claims of fact.43
This exemption seems odd in light of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy's
justification for elevating the First Amendment status of commercial speech in the
first place: that it provides consumers with useful information about product and
price. If, as the Court has said, "the elimination of false and deceptive claims serves
to promote the one facet of commercial [speech] that warrants First Amendment
protection," then commercial speech devoid of truthful claims of fact would seem
to warrant none.44 Since factual information is what makes advertising valuable, the
lack of factual content in image advertising might have led economists to conclude
that image advertising lacks value.45 They avoided this conclusion by theorizing
value in image advertising unrelated to the content of the speech. Even noninformational advertising promotes market efficiency, economists argued, by
signaling to consumers that the advertiser stands behind her product. The idea is
that an advertiser's willingness to devote resources to promotional campaigns tells
consumers that the advertised product is worthy of their purchase.46
This signaling theory of value depends on the contestable assumptions that (1)
image advertising campaigns are expensive, (2) advertising expenditures are
proportional to product investments, and (3) consumers are aware of facts one and

42. See generallyRONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE 71-77
(1996) (discussing the shift from informational to image advertising); JACKSON LEARS, FABLES OF
ABUNDANCE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF ADVERTISING IN AMERICA 246 (1994) (discussing the advent
of "identity" promotions).
43. Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (setting forth
Lanham Act, section 43(a) elements, including that there be a claim of fact that is false). See generally
Ivan L. Preston, The Definition of Deceptiveness in Advertising and Other Commercial Speech, 39
CATH. U. L. REV. 1035. 1040-49 (1990) (discussing elements ofLanham Act and FTC false advertising
claims); FED. TRADE COMM'N, DECEPTION POLICY STATEMENT, Supra note 35. at 14. appended to
Cliffdale Assoc 's,103 F.T.C. at 181 (distinguishing falsifiable claims of fact, which may be actionable,
from unfalsifiable opinion).
44. Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy,425 U.S. at 781; see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 383 ("[T]he leeway
for untruthful or misleading expression that has been allowed in other contexts has little force in the
commercial arena.").
45. See R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech. 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1. 9 (1977) ("Persuasive
advertising, which conveys no information about the properties of the goods and services being
advertised but achieves its effect through an emotional appeal, is commonly disapproved of by
economists.").
46. See Howard Beals et al., The Efficient Regulation of ConsumerInformation. 24 J.L. & ECON.
491, 506 (1981) (citing Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311
(1970)) (noting that advertising provides "signaling" function); Phillip Nelson, The Economic Value
ofAdvertising, in ADVERTISING AND SOCIETY 43, 50 (Yale Brozen ed., 1974) (advertising signals that
the brands are "winners rather than losers").
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two.4 Even if these assumptions are correct, signaling theory values
communications only indirectly as a proxy for product investment, rather than
directly for their power to speak. In the hierarchy of free speech values, speech as
signal ranks lower than speech as communication since speech itself is only
incidental to the signaling.48 It would not matter if a brand owner decided to signal
its investment by holding product-related contests or giving away money in
connection with product purchases. Any of these actions, no less than advertising,
would signal a willingness to spend in connection with the product.
Notwithstanding its questionable utility as communication, image advertising
should still lie beyond the reach of false advertising law if it cannot materially
deceive. To materially deceive, the message contained in an image must be both
influential and false. Federal regulators and courts have concluded that obvious
exaggerations-such as "xxx will make you feel a decade younger"-are of little
persuasive value to consumers.49 Marketers themselves do not share the view that
exaggerated claims of the kind that images project fail to influence consumer
behavior, or they would not invest in expensive campaigns to wield just such
influence. Indeed, marketing experts know that images may be far more persuasive
than informational claims like "four out of five people prefer Marlboros. '' 50 If
economists value image advertising for its signaling function, marketers value it for
its communicative function. Indeed, it is the potency of image advertising, some
have argued, that should make it a target for advertising regulation. 5'

47. If the only function of image advertising is to signal product value, then such advertising can
be false only if assumptions (1) and (2) above are wrong. In other words, if the promotional campaign
costs little, or the product investment is disproportionately small in comparison to marketing, and yet
the consumer believes the contrary, the advertising may be false.
48. See Randall P. Bezanson. Speaking Through Others' Voices: Authorship, Originality,and
Free Speech, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 983, 1037-38 (2003) (discussing the liberty theory of free
speech and how the First Amendment protects speech that an individual intends to express, not
unintended messages based on "interpretation of words or symbols or conduct or stimuli that might be
understood expressively by an audience").
49. FED. TRADE COMM'N, DECEPTION POLICY STATEMENT. supra note 35, at 14, appended to
Cliffdale Assoc 's, 103 F.T.C. at 181 (stating that "ordinary consumers do not take seriously" puffery
and other exaggerated statements); see also Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d
387, 390 (8th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing factual claims, on which consumers rely, from puffery): Cook,
Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. N. California Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 245 (9th Cir. 1990)
(recognizing that puffery is not actionable in part because "consumer reliance will be induced by
specific rather than general assertions").
50. The rise of image advertising drew on cognitive research suggesting that consumers are as
likely to be moved by a product's image and their emotions as by its price and performance. See
generally Sarah C. Haan, The "PersuasionRoute" of the Law: Advertising and Legal Persuasion, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1299 & n.91 (2000) (describing the effect of "pictures and animation [as]
evok[ing a] greater consumer response"): Yoav Hammer, Expressions Which Preclude Rational
Processing. The Casefor Regulating Non-InformationalAdvertisements, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 435,
440- 1 (2005) (describing study results showing that, among other techniques, "attractive photography
and animation can "create such positive emotional response"). New studies reinforce these findings.
See, e.g.. Sandra Blakeslee. If You Have a 'Buy Button' in Your Brain, What Pushes It?, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 2004, at F5 (discussing recent studies of susceptibility of the human brain to images).
51. See, e.g., Collins & Skover, supra note 18, at 697 (supporting image advertising regulation
because such advertising promotes "fantasized decisions by the consumer").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss4/3

10

Goodman: Peer Promotions and False Advertising Law

2007]

PEER PROMOTIONS AND FALSE ADVERTISING LAW

The bigger obstacle to the regulation of image advertising is not that it is
impotent, but that images convey plural statements simultaneously that are not
susceptible to judgments of truth or falsity. As Michael Madow has put it, "such
advertisements do not involve 'deception' or 'misrepresentation' ... [because they
have] no truth-value. 5 2 This is not to say that an image can never be false in at least
one of its meanings. Marlboro cigarettes, for example, do not actually promote
masculine vigor, and yet consumers may be influenced by such images to make
purchases because they seek to gain or express such vigor.53 But the Marlboro Man
image says many other things at once. In addition to what it says about the effect
of smoking Marlboro cigarettes, it says something about men in the American West
and even may refer to the image of smoking in films.54 This is commentary beyond
the commercial. The element of the ad that may be materially false advertising
cannot be separated from the elements of the ad that have little to do with the
product being advertised.
Any attempt to sift the complex communicative structure of image advertising
might well have upset the balance between consumer protection and speech
interests that commercial speech jurisprudence seeks to accomplish. As discussed
above, the Supreme Court has posited that commercial speech is more immune to
the chilling effects of regulation in part because commercial speakers have the
incentive and ability to verify their utterances.55 This assumption has some merit
when speakers are communicating product facts, but not when they are projecting
product images which lack clear meaning and are difficult to falsify.56 Given this,

52. Michael Madow, Private Ownershipof PublicImage: PopularCulture andPublicityRights,
81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 237 (1993) (citing Sam Murumba, Character Merchandising in
Australia Welcome Home Wanderer, INTELL. PROP. FORUM, Nov. 1990, at 10).
53. It was the influential quality of image advertising portraying "youthful or virile-looking or
sophisticated persons enjoying cigarettes in interesting and exciting situations" that rendered such
advertisements the legal equivalent to literal "statements" on a public issue. Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d
1082, 1086-87 (D.C. Cir. 1968). As a result such image advertising triggered broadcaster obligations
to permit contrasting views. Id.
54. See generally ROBERT SOBEL, THEY SATISFY: THE CIGARETTE IN AMERICAN LIFE 128 31
(1978) (quoting a Philip Morris executive as saying "[t]he image of the man that we projected was one
of the successful up-the-hard-way sort of guy, who got himself tattooed somewhere along the line.
Gray, mature, rugged .... The consumer who lights up the product we've conditioned him.");
Michael E. Starr, The Marlboro Man: Cigarette Smoking and Masculinity in America, J. OF POP.
CULTURE 17, 45 56 (1984) (discussing the portrayal of the cigarette-masculinity nexus in films and
cigarette advertising).
55. See supra note 40.
56. The other justification the Court has used to downplay the risk of chilling commercial speech
would seem to apply equally to image and informational advertising: because commercial speakers have
commercial motivations to speak. their speech is hardier than noncommercial speech. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985) ("[A]dvertising... is hardy and unlikely
to be deterred by incidental state regulation."); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748. 772 n.24 (1976) ("Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial
profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and for[e]gone entirely."). For
criticism, see Martin H.Redish, The Value ofFree Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591.633 (1982). arguing
that we would not tolerate regulation of the commercial media, such as magazines and newspapers
although it may be just as "hardy" as commercial advertising.
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the regulation of false image advertising would likely chill all image advertising,
making regulation too costly from a free speech perspective.57
C. IntegratedAdvertising
This same kind of balancing between the benefits of advertising regulation and
its speech costs is evident in the law's approach to integrated marketing
communications, the third phase of modern marketing.58 IMC has been defined as
the use of "all forms of communication and all sources of brand or company
contacts as prospective message delivery channels . . . [with the] goal [of]
influenc[ing] buying behavior through directed persuasive communication targeted
to a broad range of stakeholders that influence brand image and organizational
reputation. 5 9 To a large extent, this program began in the early 1990s 6 ° with what
marketing theorists have called "one voice marketing communications," whereby
companies attempt to unify the message transmitted in brand advertising, public
relations, and point of sale promotions." The first stage of the integration effort is
internal to the corporation to ensure that public relations, marketing, and sales
departments coordinate their messages.62
Ultimately, the purpose of "one voice marketing" is integration not only within
the corporate communications departments, but between the corporate message and
the consumer's consciousness. This kind of integration requires marketing
messages that the consumer can easily absorb. Product integration into editorial
content like film and television programming is a time-tested way to infiltrate

57. Indeed, some commentators point to the seamless mix of commercial pitch and noncommercial
commentary in image advertising as reason to jettison the commercial speech category as unworkable.
See, e.g., 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 20:43. at 20-141
(2006) ("Commercial speech, as speech, should presumptively enter the debate with full First
Amendment protection."); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner. Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76
VA. L. REV. 627, 631-38 (1990) (criticizing arguments for less protection of commercial speech).
58. See TERENCE A. SHIMP, ADVERTISING. PROMOTION, & SUPPLEMENTAL ASPECTS OF
INTEGRATED MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS 8 (6th ed. 2003); Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, The Legal
Challenge of Integrated Marketing Communication (1MC): Integrating Commercial and Political
Speech. 34 J. ADVERTISING 93, 99-101 (2005) (explaining the implications of corporate IMC messages
and the likelihood of increased government regulation of corporate communications). For one of the
very few pieces of legal scholarship to address the commercial speech implications ofIMC, see Tamara
R. Piety. Free Advertising: The CaseforPublicRelations as CommercialSpeech, 10 LEWIS & CLARI.
L. REV. 367, 402-08 (2006).
59. Fitzpatrick, supra note 58, at 94.
60. Id. at 93.
61. Glen J. Nowak & Joseph Phelps, Conceptualizing the IntegratedMarketing Communications
Phenomenon: An Examination of Its Impact on Advertising Practices and Its Implications for
Advertising Research, J. CURRENT ISSUES & RESEARCH IN ADVERTISING 16, 49 66 (1994) (identifying
"one voice marketing communications," "coordinated marketing communications campaigns," and
"integrated communication" as related corporate communications phenomena): see also James C.
Reilly, The Role of IntegratedMarketing Communications in Brand Management, THE ADVERTISER
32 (1991).
62. See Philip J. Kitchen et al., The Emergence of IMC: A Theoretical Perspective, 44 J.
ADVERTISING RES. 19,21 (2004).
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consumer consciousness with promotional messages.63 Companies are now taking
integration further with branded entertainment, where the sponsor itself controls the
editorial content and conforms that content to the product's needs.64 Buzz
marketing65 and viral marketing66 are other tools of integrated marketing. These
techniques work by getting consumers to spread sponsor-generated messages, often
without any evidence of the source of the messages.
As IMC evolved, marketers began to turn their attention from their own
communications agenda to the consumer's, looking for peer-generated cues to
shape the one-voice marketing messages.68 The brand owner may use this consumer
information to improve a traditional, centralized advertising campaign, or the owner
may give the consumer significant control over the marketing message as part of
a more decentralized approach. In either case, what makes the consumer cues
valuable is the marketer's "access to consumer databases and computational
resources."69 IMC has evolved into a technologically sophisticated, data-driven
effort on the part of advertisers to engage consumers with the marketing message

63. See Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth MarketingandEditorialIntegrity. 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 93-95
(2006) (discussing the history and prevalence of product placement); see also Digital Future of the
United States: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Telecommunications & the Internetof the H. Comm.
on Energy and Commerce. 110th Cong. (May 10. 2007) (statement of Philip Rosenthal. Writers Guild
of America), availableathttp://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte mtgs/110-ti-hrg.051007.Rosenthaltestimony.pdf (describing the process of product integration in which the product becomes "apartof
the storyline with characters required to talk about the product" and claiming that "product integration
occurred more than 4000 times on network primetime television" in 2006).
64. See Goodman, supra note 63, at 95 96 (discussing the movement of brand owners into the
media content production business).
65. Buzz marketing is the practice of building excitement around a brand through individual
word-of-mouth referrals. See MICHAEL J. WOLF, THE ENTERTAINMENT ECONOMY: How MEGA-MEDIA
FORCES ARE TRANSFORMING OUR LIVES 266-71 (1999) (describing buzz marketing practices such as
Audi's use of celebrities to drive a new model vehicle as a form of endorsement in order to generate
buzz).
66. Viral marketing involves the dissemination of online messages entertaining enough to induce
consumers to pass them along like a virus. See Theresa Howard, 'Viral 'Ads Are So Fun You Pass 'Em
Along, USA TODAY, May 19, 2005, at lB.
67. See Maria Flores Letelier et al.. Strategiesfor ViralMarketing, in KELLOGG ON INTEGRATED
MARKETING 90 (Dawn lacobucci & Bobby Calder eds.. 2003) (analyzing different types of buzz and
viral marketing). See generally Letter from Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir. for Advertising Practices, FTC,
to Gary Ruskin, Executive Dir., Commercial Alert (Dec. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff 061211 staffopiniontocommercialalert.pdf (discussing buzz, viral,
and word-of-mouth marketing and deciding to review instances of alleged violation of the FTC rules
on a case-by-case basis); Letter from Gary Ruskin, Executive Dir., Commercial Alert, to Donald Clark,
Sec'y, Fed. Trade Comm'n (Oct. 18, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/
06121 lcommercialalertrequest.pdf (petitioning the FTC to declare certain buzz and viral marketing
techniques to be illegal).
68. See Kitchen et al., supra note 62, at 22; Shu-pei Tsai, IntegratedMarketing as Management
of Holistic Consumer Experience, 48 Bus. HORIZONS 431, 434 (2005) ("[T]he outside-in database[]
helps to determine consumer perceptions and market trends, and is at the center of IMC.")
69. Kitchen et al., supra note 62, at 20 (citing several studies). For excellent treatments of the
development of integrated marketing techniques, see KENNETH E. CLOW & DONALD BAACK,
INTEGRATED ADVERTISING, PROMOTION, AND MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS (2002); JOSEPH TUROW,
NICHE ENVY: MARKETING DISCRIMINATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2006).
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based on individual tastes and habits. 70 According to media commentator Jeff
Chester, it has become "a ubiquitous system of micropersuasion."' I
Even more so than image advertising, IMC stresses the boundary between
commercial and noncommercial speech because it weaves promotional messages
through diverse kinds of communications, including press releases, letters, and
mass advertising. While each of these communications presents a different mix of
commercial and noncommercial speech, advertising regulation applies only to
commercial speech. The FTC regulates only that advertising it deems to be
commercial speech.72 Moreover, courts have held that the "commercial advertising
or promotion" that is actionable under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act must be
commercial speech.7 3 Under the most widely adopted test, a communication is
actionable advertising or promotion under the Lanham Act if it is "(1) commercial
speech; ... ([2]) for the purpose of influencing consumers to buy [an advertiser's]
goods or services"; and (3) "disseminated sufficiently to the relevant purchasing
public. 7 4 Since the first factor whether the speech is commercial is so often

70. See generally TUROW, supra note 69, at 76-98 (discussing the development of consumer
behavior databases from Internet traffic and marketers' use of this data to customize advertising and
integrate promotional messages into online contacts).
71. Jeff Chester, Commentary, The DarkSide ofInteractive Marketing,ADVERTISING AGE, Jan.
9. 2007, available at http://adage.com/digital/article?article id 114177: see also JEFF CHESTER,
DIGITAL DESTINY: NEW MEDIA AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY 128 30 (2007) (discussing examples
of digital micropersuasion).
72. See, e.g.. In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 111 F.T.C. 539, 541 (Mar. 4. 1988) (interlocutory
order) (reviewing an advertisement with editorial comment and explaining that, "unless
the ... advertisement can be classified as commercial speech, it is not subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction") Nat'l Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC. 570 F.2d 157, 159. 163 (7th Cir. 1977)
(affirming FTC ruling that generic advertisements of eggs by a trade association constituted commercial
speech subject to the FTC's jurisdiction under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45 (2000)).
73. See Sports Unlimited, Inc. v. Lankford Enters.. Inc., 275 F.3d 996, 1003 & n.7 (10th Cir.
2002) (recognizing the district court's application of the four-part analysis that requires actionable
"commercial advertising or promotion" be commercial speech); First Health Group Corp. v. BCE
Emergis Corp., 269 F.3d 800, 803 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the language of section 43(a)( 1)(B)
indicates that "commercial advertising or promotion" is a category of commercial speech). The statute
itself is not explicit and the legislative history is ambiguous. See 134 CONG. REc. 31852 (1988)
(remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier) (explaining that the false advertising provision "should not be read in
any way to limit political speech, consumer or editorial comment, parodies, satires, or other
constitutionally protected material"): see also Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A. v. Am. Inst. of
Physics, 859 F. Supp. 1521. 1533-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (treating Kastenmeier's remarks as representing
the views of Congress). Butsee 134 CONG. REc. 32053 (1988) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini) (noting that
"commercial" excludes only political speech; any "misrepresentation relating to goods or services"
qualifies as commercial advertising).
74. See Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers, 859 F. Supp. at 1535-36 (including a fourth element
of the defendant and plaintiff being in commercial competition with each other); see also Proct[e]r &
Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262, 1273 74 (10th Cir. 2000) (adopting the Gordon & Breach test);
Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725. 735 (9th Cir. 1999) (adopting the
Gordon & Breach test); Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co.. 86 F.3d 1379. 1384 (5th Cir. 1996) (adopting
the Gordon & Breach test). The original Gordon & Breach test had a fourth factor that the defendant
be in commercial competition with plaintiff which the Second Circuit did not adopt in a subsequent
case. See Fashion Boutique of Short Hills. Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc.. 314 F.3d 48, 58 (2d Cir. 2002)
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dispositive, a central definitional question for advertising law is whether the
defendant was engaging in commercial speech.
It would be hard enough to sift commercial from noncommercial speech
elements within a single communication if the definition of commercial speech
were clear. But the Supreme Court's definition is notoriously plastic. Narrowly
conceived, commercial speech is a communication "that does no more than propose
a commercial transaction."' 76 Broadly conceived, it is a communication that is
primarily economic in motivation. Inthe end, the Court has abandoned definitions
in favor of "common sense" understandings of the differences between commercial
and noncommercial speech. 78 As Robert Post has noted, "[t]he judgments of
common sense ultimately revolve around questions of [the] social meaning" of the
speech, not its actual content.79
The social meaning, or commonsense understanding, of speech is hardly self
evident when speech serves both commercial and noncommercial functions. Even
advertisements for commercial products may be considered noncommercial for
First Amendment purposes when mixed with noncommercial messages. ° The
Supreme Court has used two heuristics to identify commercial speech in cases of
mixed speech. First, it has distinguished noncommercial elements that are
"inextricably intertwined" with commercial ones, rendering the speech
noncommercial,"1 from those that have been unnecessarily grafted onto commercial
speech so as to "link[] a product to a current public debate. 82 Second, it has looked

(noting "that the requirement is not set forth in the text of Section 43(a) and express[ing] no view on
its soundness"). Butsee FirstHealth Group.269 F.3d at 803 (noting that a characteristic of commercial
advertising orpromotion is that it is distributed "to anonymous recipients, as distinguished from face-toface communication").
75. STEVEN G. BRODY & BRUCE E. H. JOHNSON, ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH: A
FIRST AMENDMENT GUIDE § 9:2, at 9-3 to -4 (2d ed. 2006).
76. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001) (citing Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.. 425 U.S. 748, 776 (1976)).
77. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557. 561 (1980) (defining
commercial speech as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience" (citations omitted)).
78. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.. 514 U.S. 476, 482 (1995) (relying on "commonsense"
distinctions between commercial and noncommercial speech (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
562)); Va State Bd.of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (noting there are "commonsense differences"
between commercial and noncommercial speech).
79. Robert Post, The ConstitutionalStatusofCommercialSpeech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 18 (2000)
(arguing that the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech turns on whether the
speech is an "effort to engage public opinion or instead simply to sell products").
80. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) ("The mere fact that these
pamphlets are conceded to be advertisements clearly does not compel the conclusion that they are
commercial speech.").
81. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781,796 (1988) (finding that, because
the two categories of speech were "inextricably intertwined," charitable solicitations remained fully
protected noncommercial speech even when state law required fundraisers include speech of a
commercial nature in their solicitations).
82. See Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474, 475 (1989) (citing
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5) (finding that speech promoting the purchase of Tupperware
products was not inextricably intertwined with noncommercial speech about home economics because
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to economic motivation and advertising format. Thus, there is "strong support" for
characterizing speech as commercial when it promotes a specific product, is
published as a paid advertisement, and is economically motivated.83
Application of this mixed speech jurisprudence drew widespread attention
when applied in the IMC context in the California Supreme Court case of Kasky v.
Nike, Inc.84 This case arose from the efforts of Nike to defend its brand against the
growing perception that Nike shoes were produced in off-shore plants that exploited
child workers.15 Following the precepts of IMC, Nike refuted these allegations with
.,one voice" at multiple points of customer contact in "press releases, in letters to
newspapers, [and] in a letter to university presidents and athletics directors. '86
A consumer activist sued Nike, alleging that these communications were false
under California's false advertising law." The threshold question for the California
Supreme Court was whether Nike's speech was commercial, and the court held that
it was under a new, "limited-purpose" commercial speech test.88 This test, which
focused on the identity of the speaker, the content of the speech, and the intended
audience, 9 faithfully applied the Supreme Court's mixed speech precedents, with
one notable exception. The test was unconcerned with the format of the
communication that is, whether it takes the form of a traditional advertisement.
In adopting this test, the California court was acknowledging the realities of IMC
and the diversity of corporate marketing strategies. It was also potentially
expanding liability for false advertising.
The Supreme Court granted Nike's petition for certiorari, but then dismissed
the writ as improvidently granted.9" Justice Breyer dissented from this dismissal,
arguing that the California Supreme Court's expansive definition of commercial
speech would unduly chill corporations from speaking on public issues.9 It would
have been very useful to have a decision on the merits that defined advertising in

"[n]o law ofman or ofnature makes it impossible to sell housewares without teaching home economics,
or to teach home economics without selling housewares"); Bolger. 463 U.S. at 68 ("[A]dvertising which
'links a product to a current public debate' is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection
afforded noncommercial speech ....
Advertisers should not be permitted to immunize false or
misleading product information from government regulation simply by including references to public
issues." (internal citations omitted)).
83. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67.
84. 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted,537 U.S. 1099 (2003), cert. dismissed,539 U.S. 654
(2003).
85. See id. at 248.
86. Id. For excellent background on the case, see Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The
Landmark Free-Speech Case that Wash 't: The Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965
(2004).
87. Nike, 45 P.3d at 249 (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17500 (West 1996), amended
by CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West Supp. 2007)).
88. Id. at 256.
89. Id.
90. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky. 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
91. Id. at 680 81 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Kasky, 45 P.3d at 272 (Brown, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority's test for commercial speech, if "taken to its logical conclusion, renders all
corporate speech commercial speech").
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the new marketing environment. Lanham Act courts have already extended the
class of regulable "commercial advertising or promotion" well beyond traditional
mass advertising campaigns, exhibiting flexibility when it comes to advertising
format.92 In its Supreme Court brief supporting Kasky's position in part, the United
States urged the Court to disregard considerations of format in its commercial
speech determinations, arguing that "ifa manufacturer who markets rain-forestfriendly coffee falsely extols the virtues of its environmental practices in an Earth
Day op-ed, there is no reason those statements should be off-limits
to a fraud action
93
law.
common
the
of
requirements
the
meets
that otherwise
Peer promotions add another layer to the question Nike posed of where the
advertising boundary lies, and how that line-drawing implicates free speech. Like
the marketing techniques at issue in Nike, peer promotions engage consumers in
new ways by linking commercial and noncommercial speech. They go one step
beyond by obscuring authorship to further entangle the promotional and the
expressive.
III. PEER PROMOTIONS AND ADVERTISING LAW

Coca-Cola's change of heart about the Diet Coke-Mentos geyser video
reflected its own migration to a more consumer-driven brand of IMC. At first, the
company insisted that it, and not a couple of geeks from Maine, should control its
publicity. The company's ultimate acquiescence in, and exploitation of, peergenerated publicity represents a significant shift in marketing strategy and raises
questions for advertising regulation. Once Coca-Cola begins directing traffic to and
otherwise promoting the video, is the company responsible under false advertising
law for any false claims in the video? What if, for example, it turns out that Mentos
mints do not actually have such a stirring effect on Diet Coke?
Peer promotions with advertising elements will raise the same issues we have
seen before in advertising law, such as the mixed speech problem and image
advertising. But they also pose the new complication of mixed authorship of
commercial messages. Justice Breyer was troubled by the difficulty of sifting
commercial from noncommercial speech in Nike where speaker identity was clear.
Peer promotions hide speaker identity. The determination of "commercialness"
requires examination not only of the content and context of speech, but also who
is speaking and why. In other words, the first prong of the Nike test, which focuses
on the identity of the speaker, becomes a matter of interpretation and investigation.
While some peer promotions constitute or are allied with commercial speech,

92. See, e.g.. Proct[e]r & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262, 1276 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding
that an email message suggesting a competitor's profits supported devil worship constituted commercial
advertising or promotion); Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1382, 1386 (5th Cir. 1996)
(finding evidence of dissemination sufficient where statements were made to eleven out of seventy-four
potential customers).
93. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539
U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 899100, at *28 n.13 (arguing that "[t]he forum for [false or
misleading] statements is simply not dispositive")
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others clearly are not. Below, I sort peer promotions into pure peer, fake peer, and
mixed peer and explore the relationship between message control and false
advertising law.
A.

Pure Peer

A pure peer promotion is a spontaneous celebration, or denigration, of a brand
produced by parties unrelated to, and not in competition with, the brand owner. The
Diet Coke-Mentos geyser video started out as a pure peer promotion. Such
consumer commentary on favorite or most reviled brands abounds on Internet
social networking and media sharing web sites. Examples include a blog for Apple
Macintosh with ads and spoof ads94 ; a sneaker connoisseur's video describing a
Converse and Nike shoe collection9 5; and a film detailing a woman's love story
with her Jack in the Box ball.96
Whether it intentionally or unintentionally promotes (or disparages) a product,
a pure peer promotion is not commercial speech under any of the Supreme Court's
tests. It does not propose a commercial transaction, nor does it promote sales for
commercial purposes. 9 If it is not commercial speech, the communication is not
actionable under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act98 or the Federal Trade
Commission Act.99 Thus, the Diet Coke-Mentos geyser video, so long as the brand
owner has nothing to do with the speech, is unregulable noncommercial speech no
matter what its content.
This does not mean that peer promotions cannot harm. They can easily contain
misstatements that persuade consumers to buy a product. But even more than with
image advertising, regulating this kind of false speech would impose too high a
cost. It would chill not only commercial speech, but noncommercial speech not
only speech by advertisers, but by unrelated individuals.

94. Mac Fanatic, http://www.macfanatic.net/blog/ (last visited June 4, 2007).
95. V-Blog Episode 4-Shoes and an Interview with Ghostface, Posting of lildrummerl987 to
YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eha0VeewtmM (Nov. 16, 2006).
96. Jack and Jill, Posting ofJasonEppinkto YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v JU-70lFv91 (Mar. 8, 2006).
97. See supra notes 76 79 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding
that section 43(a) is inapplicable to an individual using portions of plaintiff's artwork in a pamphlet
criticizing public funding of the arts and noting that the Lanham Act "has never been applied to stifle
criticism of the goods or services of another by one, such as a consumer advocate, who is not engaged
in marketing or promoting a competitive product or service"); see also Mark A. Lemley & Stacey L.
Dogan. GroundingTrademarkLawThrough TrademarkUse. 92 IOWAL. REV. (forthcoming July 2007)
(arguing that "the 'use in commerce' and 'in connection with' requirements have been widely
understood to impose infringement liability only on those who created confusion in the process of
selling, marketing, or advertising their own products").
99. See supra notes 30-31.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss4/3

18

Goodman: Peer Promotions and False Advertising Law

2007]

PEER PROMOTIONS AND FALSE ADVERTISING LAW

B. Fake Peer
Some promotions that appear to be peer-generated are actually generated by the
brand owner who has masked its sponsorship. Critics have called such promotions,
when they take the form of a blog, a fake blog or "flog."' '° An example is Sony's
campaign over the 2006 holiday season for its PSP (PlayStation Portable) handheld
game console. Sony's advertising agency Zipatoni created a blog called "All I want
for Christmas is a PSP."' ' The blog featured a hip man who is helping his friend
acquire the coveted device. 1 2 These characters were so ostentatiously cool that they
raised the suspicions of enterprising viewers who discovered that Sony's
advertising firm owned the domain name.'0 3 Sony stopped allowing readers to
comment on the site once its agent's involvement was publicized.'0 ° Future
"floggers" will undoubtedly be more careful to disguise their involvement.' 5
From the advertising law perspective, advertiser-created content designed to
appear as a peer promotion is no different from an "old media" advertising
campaign. Such communications should constitute commercial speech and
"advertising or promotion" under the Lanham Act, regardless of whether the
promotion looks like it is peer-generated. However, the format of the promotion
may influence the degree to which false statements are credible, and therefore
materially deceptive, as discussed below.

100. Stephen Baker & Heather Green, Blogs Will Change Your Business, Bus. WK., May 2,2005,
at 56, 64 (defining "flog" as "fake blog"); see also Stuart Elliott, How to Lose Cadillacand Other
Lessons on Madison Ave. in 2006, N.Y. TIMES. Dec. 18. 2006, at C8 (claiming that Tom Siebert of
MediaPost coined the term "flog").
10 I. See Shankar Gupta, Sony Confesses to Creating 'Flog,'Shutters Comments, ONLINE MEDIA
DAILY,
Dec.
14,
2006,
http: //publications.mediapost.com /index.cfm?
fuseaction=Articles.showArticle&art aid=52541 (describing the phony blog of Sony Computer
Entertainment America, which used the advertising agency Zipatoni to develop
alliwantforxmasisapsp.com to promote its Sony PSP using "faux hip-hop and Internet lingo" and
filtering out marketing-related words, such as "viral," "advertisement." and "campaign," in readers'
comments).
102.
See All I Want for Xmas Is a PSP, http://consumerist.com.8045/pspflog/
www.alliwantforxmasisapsp.com/blog/default.html (last visited May 22, 2007) (displaying a copy of
the original PSP flog); see also Posting by Monologue to YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v-tX 3GEvF8RQ (Dec. 14. 2006) (displaying rap video originally posted on the PSP flog and posting
history of the original site).
103. Gupta, supra note 101.
104. See id.
105. In some cases, the sponsor hides itself so thoroughly that it does not even mention its brand,
at least not initially. Unilever, for example, in early 2007 posted '[a] profanity-laced video of a
screaming bride who cuts chunks from her hair in a fit over her style." Jack Neff, Unilever,P&G Battle
Hits YouTube, ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 12, 2007, at 4. The video drew 12 million views on YouTube
as well as television publicity. Id. Amid charges of a hoax, Unilever came forward to claim
responsibility for the video, saying that it intended in later installments to make the link with its hair
care product and "hair wig outs" explicit. Id. Whether Unilever always intended to claim authorship is
unclear.
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C. Mixed Peer
The application of advertising law to peer promotions becomes trickier when
it comes to mixed peer content. Peer promotions are mixed with sponsorship when
a brand owner solicits or adopts a pure peer promotion for its own publicity
purposes. In such cases, the sponsor's involvement may be manifest or it may be
hidden a difference which I will suggest is important for advertising law. As
discussed above, advertising law makes particular assumptions about the value of
advertising to consumers and the likelihood that false communications will harm
them. These assumptions may not hold where authorship is masked. If an advertiser
is speaking, but the consumer does not know it, false statements may be less
misleading because they lack the authority of the sponsor. Or they may be more
misleading because they carry the credibility of an unbiased peer communication.
Depending on assumptions about the credibility of peer communications, the harm
that false stealth promotions pose to market transparency may be greater or less
than that of traditional false advertising. Moreover, the informational value of
commercial speech contained in the peer promotion may be more or less worthy of
protecting.
1. Manifest Sponsor Involvement
Sponsor involvement is manifest in a peer promotion when the sponsor either
adopts or solicits peer-generated speech for its use in an advertising campaign.
Coca-Cola followed the adoption model when it chose to exploit the geyser video.
What had been a pure peer promotion then became a mixed peer promotion with
manifest endorsement by the sponsor.
Alternatively, a sponsor may solicit a peer promotion, hoping to engage those
consumers who make the ads and create buzz around the brand for everyone else.
Chevrolet tried this approach in 2006 with its Tahoe SUV by providing video and
audio on its web site and inviting users to create their own promotions. 106 When
users returned with polished spots that used Chevy's materials to mock the Tahoe
for its gas consumption, Chevy executives defended their actions, asserting that this
loss of control over the brand was the price to be paid for the benefits of peer
involvement.'" Hoping to have it both ways achieving buzz and engagement
without losing control Chevy and others held a contest in 2007 for peer-generated
ads, the winner of which received a $2.6 million Super Bowl spot, as well as
repeated play on dozens of web portals.' °8

106. See Julie Bosman. Chevy Tries a Write- Your-Own-AdApproach, and the PotshotsFly. N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2006, at C 1.
107. Id. (quoting company spokeswoman, "You do turn over your brand to the public, and we
knew that we were going to get some bad with the good. But it's part of playing in this space.")
108. Brian Steinberg. Super Bowl Advertisers Hand Amateurs the Ball, WALL ST. J.. Jan. 12.
2007, at B I (describing contests run by Doritos, Chevrolet, and the National Football League "inviting
average people to submit ideas-or in the case of Doritos, the actual ads for the game"). The NFL
contest drew over 1,700 entries. Id. While Doritos invited completed ads and received more than 1,000
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Once a brand owner adopts the peer promotion as its own, featuring the
promotion on its web site or distributing it by other means, this speech should be
considered the brand owner's advertisement. That the sponsor has chosen to use an
amateur instead of an agency to produce its advertisements should not change the
analysis. Moreover, under the Lanham Act case law, it should not make a difference
whether the brand owner initially solicited the ads or simply adopted them later.'0°
In either case, the brand owner is sponsoring speech for promotional purposes.
As brand owners become more involved in the production of editorial content,
it may be more difficult to determine when they are speaking as sponsors. When a
brand owner displays peer promotions on its web site or buys a Super Bowl spot,
it is acting solely as a sponsor. But brand owners may also take on the role of media
producer or distributor to promote their brands indirectly."' An example is
Anheuser Busch's web "television" channel called Bud.TV. 1" The purpose of
Bud.TV is to promote the Budweiser brand, as is clear from its exclusion of
underage viewers.112 But much of the content that Bud.TV hosts and plans to host
has no obvious connection with the brand. Indeed, the channel may ultimately
become a video distribution service that displays peer productions Anheuser Busch
does not control." 3 In such an environment, the display of a peer promotion for
Budweiser that the brand owner did not adopt or solicit would remain a pure peer
promotion, while another that involved more sponsor control would fall into the
mixed peer category with potential exposure to advertising regulation.
2. Hidden Sponsor Involvement
Another form of mixed peer promotion involves the brand owner as hidden
sponsor. These are stealth peer promotions, exemplified by the erstwhile blog,
"Walmarting Across America." '14 This blog recorded the adventures of a couple

entries. Chevrolet required that ideas be submitted in a professional layout to be selected by the
company and its agency. Id.The NFL invited ideas to be judged by the NFL marketing staff with input
from an online voting public. Id; see also Suzanne Vranica, Super Bowl Advertisers Play Itfor Laughs,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2007, at BI (reviewing advertisements viewed by approximately 90 million
viewers and costing advertisers as much as $2.6 million).
109. See, e.g., Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 113 14 (6th Cir. 1995); Gordon &
Breach Sci. Publishers v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 859 F. Supp. 1521, 1544 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that
articles were protected when initially published, but not when promotional copies were distributed for
purpose of selling authors' work).
110. See Goodman, supra note 63, at 102 03.
11I.
Welcome to Bud.TV, http://www.bud.tv/default.aspx (last visited June 20, 2007).
112. Id.
113. T.L. Stanley, Star-StuddedBud.TVLaunches with a Splash, ADVERTISING AGE. Feb. 5,2007,
at S-4. Bud.TV is a "TV network-like web destination" with multiple channels of original entertainment
programming, "lbcusing on stand-up and sketch comedy, filmmaking contests, commercials shot by
consumers, talk shows, sports. and parody newscasts." Id.
114. See Pallavi Gogoi, An RV that Runs On Wal-Mart, Bus. WK.. Oct. 23. 2006, at 13: WalMarting Across America, http://walmartingacrossamerica.com/ (last visited June 4, 2007); see also
Pallavi Gogoi, Wal-Mlfart's Jim and Laura: The Real Story, Bus. Wi., Oct. 8, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/oct2006/db20061009 579137.htm?chan
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who set off in April 2006 to travel across America in an RV and sleep in Wal-Mart
parking lots. 115 One of the travelers, Laura St. Claire, 116 thought she should get
permission from Wal-Mart to publish the reports. She got more than permission. A
Wal-Mart-backed organization, Working Families for Wal-Mart, said it would
actually sponsor the trip." 7 The content of the blog, recounting the stories of happy
and grateful Wal-Mart employees, set off criticism that the author of the blog was
a shill for Wal-Mart.' 18
These kinds of stealth peer promotions, where sponsor involvement is hidden,
mix commercial and noncommercial speech and at times conceal the true identity
of the speaker. The kinds and degree of sponsor involvement will determine the
character of the speech. In theory, the sponsor may simply fund the creation of
noncommercial speech, much as newspaper advertisers do. Or the sponsor may
direct the content of the speech, like an infomercial, rendering it commercial. Most
likely, the communication will be a mix of the two, making the application of false
advertising law difficult from a practical and normative perspective.
As in all areas of advertising law, regulatory policy must balance the harm to
consumers of false advertising against the risk of regulation to free speech. The
ambiguity of authorship in stealth peer promotions changes the relative weights in
this assessment. Recall the theory that much advertising derives utility from its
ability to signal product investment. 1 9 Campaigns using peer promotions are
unlikely to signal anything about product value and advertiser investment. This is
because consumers-the targets of the signaling may not know that the brand
owner has sponsored the promotions. Moreover, campaigns relying on peer
production and internet distribution are often inexpensive, undermining the central
premise of the signaling theory that advertising is costly. 120 Advertising that informs
neither through facts
nor signals is less worthy of protection under commercial
2
speech doctrine.1 1
On the other side of the scales, while stealth peer promotions may lack utility
as advertising, they may have more value as speech. Peer promotions surpass image
advertising in noncommercial content. Whereas image advertising features
advertiserspeech on lifestyle issues, peer promotions mix in citizen speech on such
issues. The manipulation of brands and promotional
speech is increasingly
122
becoming a vehicle for individual self expression.
Especially given their noncommercial expressive value, the benefits of

search.
115. Supra note 114.
116. See Posting of Anita French to Bizbits, http://bizbits.nwablogs.com/2006/10/ clearing the
air.html (Oct. 17. 2006, 01:22 PM) (identifying the other blogger as Jim Thresher, a freelance
photographer who works for the Washington Post).
117. See Wal-Marting Across America, supra note 114.
118. Id.
119. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batnan: The Public Interest in the AdvertisingAge,
108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1732 33 (1999) (discussing the prevalence of brands in everyday expression).
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regulating mixed peer promotions may not warrant the risks of speech-chilling
effects. This would be true where consumers are likely to be harmed from stealth
peer promotions because falsehoods in this context have little influence on
consumer decisionmaking.
The usual presumption in Lanham Act cases is that false statements are
presumptively materially deceptive. 123 But falsehoods in peer promotions are less
likely to be deceptive if the consumer discounts the reliability of such promotions.
Consumers exposed to information from unattributed or composite sources, often
casually supplied, may not believe what appear to be peer promotions. Every
statement is seen as contingent and vulnerable. False statements that are disbelieved
fail the materiality tests of the Lanham Act, the FTC Act, and other false
advertising laws. 124 If peer promotions lead to such a credibility deficit, false
statements would seem to pose little prospect of consumer harm.
Marketing theory predicts the opposite result that consumers will be more
inclined to believe promotions when they are not clearly sourced by the brand
owner. Marketing authorities instruct sponsors to keep a low profile in Web 2.0
promotions because speech that is or seems to be pure peer is more credible. 125 If
this is true, then peer promotions would seem to be highly credible and therefore
potentially harmful if misrepresenting the facts. Even more so than traditional
advertising, consumers would be126at risk of "uninformed acquiescence" to the
advertiser's promotional scheme.
Indeed, it is because consumers are more likely to believe independent voices
of promotional speech that sponsorship disclosure is central to American
information policy. 2 7The FTC, for example, promulgated Endorsement Guidelines
to protect consumers from giving apparently independent promoters unjustified
credence. The Guidelines state that "[w]hen there exists a connection between the
endorser and the seller of the advertised product which might materially affect the
weight or credibility of the endorsement . . . such connection must be fully
disclosed."' 128 In a recent decision, the FTC made clear that these guidelines applied

123. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 317 18 (2d Cir. 1982)
(citations omitted) (finding orange juice ad was facially false and did not require "reference to the
advertisement's impact on the buying public" to prove a Lanham Act violation).
124. Supra notes 35 37 and accompanying text.
125. See Letelier et al., supra note 67, at 121 25 (prescribing brand promotion strategies that
"avoid the appearance of mass marketing" to "taste-maker communities").
126. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S 761. 774-75 (1993) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447, 465 66 (1978)).
127. For more than a century, newspapers have been required to identify sponsored material. Act
of Aug. 24, 1912. ch. 389, 37 Stat. 539. 554 (budget proviso, later enacted by Act of Sept. 2. 1960, Pub.
L. No. 86-682, § 7, 74 Stat. 578. 705 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1734 (2000))): Lewis Publ'g Co. v.
Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 313 16 (1913) (upholding disclosure law). Broadcast stations are subject to
similar rules. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, § 317, 48 Stat. 1064, 1089 (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. § 317(a) (2000)) (requiring broadcasters to disclose the identity of sponsors).
128. Guides Concerning Use ofEndorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 255.5
(2006). The same emphasis on disclosure can be found in marketers' self-regulatory codes. See, e.g.,
WOMMA ETHICS CODE: HONESTY OF RELATIONSHIP (Word of Mouth Marketing Assoc., Draft 2005),
http://www.wonma.org/ethics/code/read (disapproving of"undercover" marketing in which the person
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to "buzz" or "viral" marketing efforts.129
IV. CONCLUSION

Peer promotions arise at the confluence of two rapidly moving information
trends. One is the Web 2.0 spontaneous circulation of peer-generated information
through affinity groups and ad hoc social networks. The other is the evolving
strategy of integrated marketing communications which seeks to engage consumers
in the brand owner's promotional message and to weave that message into all
consumer contacts.
This Essay has examined the phenomenon of peer promotions in the context
of previous innovations in marketing and the associated development of federal
false advertising law. Where peer promotions involve brand owners and contain
falsehoods, the law will need to balance the danger to consumers of false
commercial information with the danger to expression of speech regulation. This
is the balance with which false advertising law has long struggled. Peer promotions
complicate the assessment by obscuring speaker identity and possibly reducing both
the power of false claims to harm and the power of truthful claims to inform.
In sum, the status of peer promotions under federal false advertising law looks
something like this:
1. Pure peer promotions which do not involve the brand owner either initially
or after first distribution are noncommercial speech.
2. Fake peer promotions that are wholly controlled by the brand owner
should be considered advertising under federal law, although whether or
not false statements in such contexts should be subject to ordinary
presumptions that they are materially deceptive is another question.
3. Some mixed peer promotions (involving the brand owner to some extent)
are noncommercial speech because the sponsor is sufficiently remote from
the communication.
4. Other mixed peer promotions have enough sponsor involvement to
constitute advertising.
5. When the sponsor's involvement is manifest, these promotions are not
meaningfully different from conventional advertising.
6. When the sponsor's involvement is hidden, we need to better understand
what effect the communication has on consumers before we can know
whether stealth promotions have the same informational effects as ordinary
advertising.
As Web 2.0 marketing strategies evolve (and turn into Web 3.0, etc.), courts

endorsing a product does not make clear his relationship with the sponsor). Although the guidelines are
not compulsory, failure to make such disclosure may amount to false and deceptive advertising.
TrendMark, Inc., 126 F.T.C. 375, 378 (1998) (consent order).
129. See Letter from Mary K. Engle. supra note 67. at 2-3.
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and policymakers will have to re-examine whether advertising laws built to address
centralized, tightly controlled marketing messages are effective. Perhaps even more
importantly, the self-regulatory institutions that are so important in advertising law
must go through the same process. For example, brand owners submit many false
advertising claims to the National Advertising Division (NAD) of the Council of
Better Business Bureaus. 13 The NAD only investigates "national advertising,"
which it defines as a nationally distributed "paid commercial message., 131 Many,
if not most, Web 2.0 campaigns will not involve payment to place peer promotions.
Payments, if any, will more likely go to drive traffic to the promotions through the
purchase of search terms or links. 132 The meanings of advertisement, commercial
campaign, commercial speech, and "peer-generated" in this porous information
environment remain fluid and worth pondering.

130.

NATL ADVERTISING REVIEW COUNCIL,

COUNCIL OF BETTER Bus. BUREAUS,

THE

ADVERTISING INDUSTRY'S PROCESS OF VOLUNTARY SELF-REGULATION, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

(2005), http://www.nadreview.org/05 procedures.pdf; see also Jeffrey S. Edelstein, Self-Regulation of
Advertising. An Alternative to Litigationand GovernmentAction, 43 IDEA 509,516 (2003) (discussing
the NAD's history "as a self-regulatory mechanism for the advertising industry").
131. See NAT'L ADVERTISING REVIEW COUNCIL, supra note 130, at § 1.1 (A) (defining "national
advertising" as any nationally distributed "paid commercial message, in any medium .... if it has the
purpose of inducing a sale or other commercial transaction or persuading the audience of the value or
usefulness of a company, product or service ... and if the content is controlled by the advertiser").
132. See, e.g., Google AdWords, http://adwords.google.com (last visited June 4, 2007).
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